Корпорация и двадцатый век. История американского делового предпринимательства - Richard N. Langlois;

71. Burns (1956, p. 318).

72. Ickes (1953, p. 302); McBride (2000, chapter 7).

73. Koistinen (1998, p. 265). The Vinson-Trammell Act itself had limited the profits of private

shipyards to 10 percent, a level none would actually approach, and followed a long-standing policy of requiring half of all building to take place in government-owned shipyards.

74. Bernstein (1971, chapter 11). Dies for the all-metal Chevrolet were at the Fisher plant in Cleveland, which was also struck. GM headquarters had centralized final assembly in those two plants, but had left labor policies to the divisions, where, to the displeasure of labor, Fisher re- mained a stronghold of piece-rates. Alfred Sloan responded to the strike by centralizing GM labor policies (Freeland 2001, p. 99).

75. Nevins and Hill (1962, p. 235). 76. McBride (2000, pp. 177–78). 77. Levine (1988, pp. 438–68). 78. Kennedy (1999, p. 401).

79. The British and French feared the “utter destruction of European civilization,” which would then be replaced by Soviet domination (Tooze 2007, p. 322).

80. Reynolds (2002, pp. 44–46).

81. Kennedy (1999, p. 429).

82. Although the legislation creating the WPA had forbidden military activities, the agency

routinely constructed airports and other facilities that had deliberate strategic objectives (Sher- wood 1948, pp. 75–76).

83. Black (2003, p. 482); Kennedy (1999, p. 421). 84. Black (2003, p. 502); Wilson (2016, p. 49).

620 Notes to Chapter 7

85. Kennedy (1999, p. 429); Koistinen (1998, p. 197). 86. Craven and Cate (1955, p. 173).

87. Holley (1964, p. 131); Koistinen (1998, p. 184). 88. Craven and Cate (1955, p. xii).

89. Koistinen (1998, pp. 305–16). 90. Ickes (1954, p. 629).

91. Koistinen (2004, pp. 17–18). 92. Beasley (1947, p. 235).

93. Lacey (2019, p. 79).

94. Higgs (1993, pp. 173–74).

95. Sloan (1941b, p. 240). “We haven’t got enough ‘economic royalists’ among us to do this job

for national defense,” Sloan said even more sarcastically in a radio interview (Baime 2014, p. 87). 96. I. F. Stone, “Labor’s Plan: 500 Planes a Day,” The Nation, December 21, 1940, pp. 624–25. 97. Sloan (1941b, p. 242).

98. Higgs (1993); Wilson (2016).

99. Rockoff (2012, p. 167).

100. Higgs (1993, p. 186); Rose et al. (1946, pp. 27–32).

101. Koistinen (2004, p. 86); US Civilian Production Administration (1947, p. 101).

102. US Civilian Production Administration (1947).

103. Janeway (1951, pp. 156–57); Kennedy (1999, pp. 478–79).

104. Koistinen (2004, p. 127).

105. Koistinen (2004, p. 97).

106. Nelson (1946, p. 67).

107. Nelson (1946, p. 85).

108. Nelson (1946, p. 125).

109. Koistinen (2004, pp. 132–36).

110. Nelson (1946, p. 122).

111. Dunn (2018); Kennedy (1999, p. 479).

112. Koistinen (2004, p. 177).

113. Using prices to allocate resources in this kind of setting is not as absurd as it may sound.

In 1942, Abba Lerner wrote an article, never published in his lifetime but widely circulated, argu- ing that prices should in fact be used to allocate materials in war mobilization. “Perhaps the greatest single contribution to the unprecedented growth of productive efficiency in modern times,” Lerner wrote, “was the establishment of the price calculus . . . as a governor of the mode of production. Yet now, when efficiency in production is more urgent than it has ever been before, we can observe a kind of sabotaging of the price mechanism as an instrument of social cooperation and its replacement over larger and larger sections of our economy by demonstra- bly less efficient devices such as rationing, priorities and allocations, not the least of whose disadvantages is their need for bureaucratic hordes who inevitably tie up the whole economy, including themselves, in ever more complex confusions of red tape” (Lerner 2013). Lerner was known as a proponent of “market socialism,” the idea that a socialist economy could be operated by a central planning agency if that agency used prices to allocate resources. On Lerner and his role in the so-called socialist calculation debate, see Lavoie (1985).

114. Nelson (1946, p. 142).

Notes to Chapter 7 621

115. Koistinen (2004, pp. 182–83).

116. “Knudsen was a member of the Supply Priorities Allocation Board and in that capacity superior to Nelson whose job was to implement the Board’s decisions; but Nelson as executive director of the Supply Priorities and Allocation Board then gave orders to the Office of Produc- tion Management, making him, in that capacity, superior to Knudsen!” (Rockoff 2012, p. 185).

117. Goodwin (1994, p. 315).

118. Rockoff (2012, p. 185).

119. Novick et al. (1949, pp. 105–6).

120. Novick et al. (1949, p. 109).

121. Novick et al. (1949, pp. 129–35).

122. Novick et al. (1949, pp. 163–204).

123. Kennedy (1999, p. 629).

124. Janeway (1951, p. 242).

125. Rockoff (2012, pp. 188–91).

126. Edelstein (2001, p. 64).

127. Lacey (2011, p. 115).

128. Rockoff (2012, p. 188).

129. Novick et al. (1949, pp. 130–49).

130. Cuff (1990, p. 110). Cuff argues that Nelson had chosen the original “horizontal” ap-

proach to avoid a structure of industry associations that might look to Americans too much like the cartels of Germany or the zaibatsu of Japan.

131. Rose et al. (1946, pp. 27, 32, 37); US Civilian Production Administration (1947, p. 146). 132. Day (1956, p. 23).

133. Holley (1964, p. 319).

134. Wilson (2016, pp. 114–20).

135. Heath (1972).

136. Rockoff (1984, p. 86–98; 2012, pp. 175–79).

137. Deep in the bowels of the OPA, in the division that rationed tires, a young lawyer from

California would form the opposite opinion. Yet his distaste for what was going on at the OPA would not stop him from one day setting up his own regime of price controls. His name was Richard M. Nixon (Yergin