Корпорация и двадцатый век. История американского делового предпринимательства - Richard N. Langlois;

22. Lee (1990a). The NRPB would be unwound during World War II. 23. Roosevelt (1942, p. 122).

24. Roosevelt (1942, p. 121).

25. Hawley (1966, pp. 412–13).

26. Brinkley (1989, p. 92). This is one of many estimates. No two sources agree on the exact numbers, though they are all in the same ballpark.

27. Miscamble (1982).

28. Waller (2005, p. 81).

29. For Arnold, “the antitrust laws were the answer of a society which unconsciously felt the

need of great organizations, and at the same time had to deny them a place in the moral and logical ideology of the social structure. They were part of the struggle of a creed of rugged indi- vidualism to adapt itself to what was becoming a highly organized society” (Arnold 1937, pp. 211–12).

30. Arnold (1937, p. 217).

31. Brinkley (1993, p. 571). Like Veblen, we might say, Arnold was a practitioner of semiotics who derided the very enterprise of making signs and symbols and who preferred instead a cool efficiency.

32. Gressley (1977, p. 47).

33. Arnold (1935).

34. Brinkley (1993, p. 569).

35. In a revealing remark in 1940, Arnold wrote that the “maintenance of a free market is as

much a matter of constant policing as the free flow of traffic on a busy intersection. It does not stay orderly by trusting to the good intentions of the drivers or by preaching to them. It is a simple problem of policing, but a continuous one” (Arnold 1940, p. 122). This is, of course, a bizarre alteration of precisely the kind of anecdote that economists typically use to persuade

618 Notes to Chapter 7

students that markets work without constant policing. (See for example Klein [2012].) Of course, economists believe that markets work without constant direction from above not in the abstract but rather to the extent that there are rules and institutions, notably property rights, that channel rent-seeking behavior in positive-sum directions. Policing is required to make sure drivers follow what are clear abstract rules, not to micromanage traffic.

36. Brinkley (1989, p. 91).

37. The ideas of Arnold and of the Chicago School law-and-economics approach to antitrust are related forms of legal realism: they both believe that legal decisions should be driven not by abstract rules but by consideration of social outcomes (Posner 1992). The principal difference is that although the Chicago School is loosely described as demanding a criterion of consumer benefit, their criterion is really economic efficiency. Efficiency typically results in greater con- sumer surplus; but, strictly speaking, the efficiency criterion requires maximizing of the sum of both consumer and producer surplus.

38. Gressley (1964, p. 230).

39. Lee (1988, p. 184).

40. The NRA had contained a Consumer Advisory Board, chaired by Mary Rumsey, the

daughter of Edward Harriman and sister of Averill Harriman. But its role was entirely symbolic in an agency driven by producer interests.

41. Hawley (1966, p. 203).

42. Brinkley (1993, p. 571).

43. Arnold (1940, p. 9).

44. Edwards (1943, p. 342).

45. Arnold (1940, pp. 192–95).

46. “The milk farmer still maintained a floor under his prices because of special legislation,”

Arnold admitted. “However, this was done by an orderly process under public control and the question of whether this legislation was wise or unwise is a subject for public debate and not for the deliberations of private conspiracies” (Arnold 1940, p. 195).

47. Brinkley (1993, p. 566). One of Arnold’s favorite examples was the union restriction that paint brushes could be no wider than 41⁄2 inches.

48. Edwards (1943, p. 346).

49. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).

50. Crane (2007, p. 97).

51. As we saw, price fixing had been illegal per se since the Trans-Missouri Freight decision of

1897. But the Appalachian Coals decision (Appalachian Coals v. United States, 288 US 344 [1933]) had introduced some elements of a rule-of-reason doctrine. On this see Kimmel (2011), who disputes the conventional reading of these cases.

52. United States v. Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).

53. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948).

54. Waller (2005, pp. 91–92).

55. Hamilton (1941); Hart (1998, pp. 91–92). On this distinction see also Hovenkamp

(2008).

56. Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945); United States v. Pullman Co., 50 F.

Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1943). In the Hartford-Empire case, the district court ordered royalty-free licensing, but the Supreme Court altered the verdict to licensing at “reasonable” rates.

Notes to Chapter 7 619

57. Gressley (1977, p. 50).

58. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941).

59. Skidelsky (1994, p. 14).

60. Keynes (1920, p. 251).

61. See for example Jonathan Kirshner, “The Man Who Predicted Nazi Germany,” New York

Times, December 7, 2019.

62. Harrison (2016, p. 154).

63. Tooze (2007, p. 17).

64. Doerr et al. (2019).

65. Galofré-Villà et al. (2019).

66. Tooze (2007, p. 47). In the event, it turned out to be more efficient to transport war

materiel across Germany by rail rather than by road. The Autobahnen were highly successful as propaganda, however, as they provided a powerful symbol of the end of austerity and of political instability, thus helping to entrench the new regime (Voigtländer and Voth 2014).

67. Burns (1956, p. 263).

68. Kennedy (1999, p. 387).

69. Koistinen (1998, chapter 14); Wiltz (1961). The chair was a Republican despite the fact

that the Democratic Party was in majority in the Senate.

70. Much has been made of Hiss’s role on the committee, even though he was actually a rela-

tively minor figure. The chief counsel was Stephen Raushenbush, the son of