Корпорация и двадцатый век. История американского делового предпринимательства - Richard N. Langlois;

138. Koistinen (2004, p. 428).

139. Goodwin (1994, p. 384).

140. Koistinen (2004, p. 422).

141. Kennedy (1999, pp. 629–30); Koistinen (2004, pp. 336–41). 142. Rockoff (2012, p. 192–94).

143. Wendt (1947).

144. Solo (1954); Tuttle (1981).

145. Wells (2002, pp. 73–80).

146. Already by December 19, 1941, Standard had come to a cross-licensing and patent-

sharing agreement with the RRC and the tire makers. The March consent decree postponed determination of any royalties until six months after the end of hostilities (Koistinen 2004, p. 154).

147. Hart (1998, p. 93).

622 Notes to Chapter 7

148. Polenberg (1980, p. 78).

149. Goodwin (1994, pp. 355–59).

150. Doris Kearns Goodwin crows that the drive netted seven pounds of rubber for every

man, woman, and child in the country. That sounds like a lot, but it constituted on the order of one-tenth of one percent of the existing stockpile.

151. After having failed to reach a patent agreement with IG Farben in the early 1930s, both B. F. Goodrich and Goodyear had independently set up pilot plants in an effort to produce synthetic rubber in a way that wouldn’t infringe existing patents (Morris 1989, pp. 8–9).

152. Solo (1954); Tuttle (1981).

153. Solo (1953, p. 33).

154. Solo (1954, p. 67); Williamson et al. (1963, p. 791).

155. Wendt (1947, pp. 213–14).

156. Solo (1953).

157. Hart (1998, pp. 135–36).

158. J. K. Smith (1988, p. 312).

159. Enos (1962). Initially, IG Farben was also part of the group, but after the war broke out,

the German concern became, in Enos’s phrase, ausgeschlossen. 160. Enos (1962, p. 188).

161. Zachary (1997).

162. Stewart (1948, p. 7).

163. Bush (1949, p. 6).

164. Owens (1994, p. 525).

165. Stewart (1948, pp. 10–12).

166. Owens (1994, p. 526).

167. Baxter (1946, pp. 169–92); Jewkes, Sawers, and Stillerman (1969, pp. 283–86); Peck and

Scherer (1962, pp. 31–37).

168. Kennedy (2013, p. 61). Half of all American radar units were produced by Western Elec-

tric, working closely with Bell Labs (Gertner 2012, p. 70).

169. Baxter (1946, pp. 221–36).

170. In conjunction with magnetron-based radar and an analog computer devised at Bell

Labs to predict the V-1 trajectory.

171. Baxter (1946, p. 222).

172. Baxter (1946, pp. 337–59); Kingston (2000); Klepper (2016, pp. 149–63).

173. Klepper (2016, p. 154).

174. Baxter (1946, p. 350).

175. Bush (1949, p. 27).

176. Hart (1998, p. 126).

177. Warren (2001, p. 193).

178. Hogan (1971b, pp. 1209–11); Warren (2008, pp. 143–44).

179. Lane (1951).

180. These would technically be authorized through the Treasury Department’s Procure-

ment Division, which was still in charge of buying for the British. 181. Lane (1951, p. 68).

182. Foster (1989, pp. 72–73).

Notes to Chapter 7 623

183. Lane (1951, pp. 202–15).

184. Lane (1951, p. 231).

185. Foster (1989, p. 84); Lane (1951, p. 210).

186. Lane (1951, p. 203).

187. Thompson (2001). The principal quality problem was the cracking of hulls, sometimes

dramatically, when welds failed. How much of this was the result of shoddy workmanship and how much merely system-wide ignorance about the application of welding to shipbuilding is subject to dispute.

188. Walton (1956, pp. 7–15).

189. Although a million and half M1s would be ready by Pearl Harbor, it had taken Win- chester a year to tool up, which forced the military to keep the Springfield in production. Some of that production was taken up by the Smith Corona typewriter company—until it was dis- covered that the military also needed typewriters, and Smith Corona had to switch back. Win- chester tooled up for its own carbine in thirteen days.

190. Hyde (2013, pp. 162–68).

191. Nelson (1946, p. 226). As would happen in almost all cases in which mass production reduced costs significantly below the contract price, the company voluntarily returned money to the government out of fear of being deemed a war profiteer.

192. Murphey (1993).

193. Hyde (2013, pp. 165–66). The Navy may have been dissatisfied with aspects of Hudson’s management other than the production of the Oerlikon, and it wanted to consolidate opera- tions with other GOCO facilities Westinghouse was operating.

194. Nelson (1946, pp. 260–68).

195. Walton (1956, pp. 87, 232).

196. Hyde (2013, pp. 117–43); Stout (1946); Walton (1956, pp. 234–37).

197. Tanks destined for Britain would indeed be made by the railroad firms.

198. Beasley (1947, pp. 277–85).

199. Overy (1995, p. 225).

200. Nevins and Hill (1962, pp. 110–17).

201. In his memoirs, Charles Sorenson (2006) is adamant that Henry Ford always called the

shots.

202. Nevins and Hill (1962, p. 141).

203. Meier and Rudwick (1979).

204. This problem only grew worse as Southern whites streamed in to fill defense jobs during

the war. Although he was personally supportive of the advancement of African Americans, Franklin Roosevelt would go no further than practical politics allowed. But when A. Philip Randolph, the head of the largely black Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, threatened a massive march on Washington, Roosevelt signed an executive order forbidding discrimination in war production (Katznelson 2013, p. 186). As manufacturers began promoting African Ameri- cans to the kinds of jobs held by whites, union locals periodically stopped production in a series of “hate strikes” throughout the defense sector (Hyde 2013, pp. 179–88).

205. Nevins and Hill (1962, pp. 161–64).

206. Charles Sorenson attributes this about-face entirely to the influence of Henry’s wife Clara, though Nevins and Hill give some of the credit to Edsel.

624 Notes to Chapter 7

207. Baime (2014, pp. 75–82); Sorenson (2006, pp. 274–76).

208. This was a policy that apparently applied only to Ford’s American operations. Ford Canada was already aiding the war effort, and by June 1940