Корпорация и двадцатый век. История американского делового предпринимательства - Richard N. Langlois;
449. U.S. v. General Electric Co. et al. (1911), 1 D&J 267.
450. Implying that the real sin was thought to be secretive ownership rather than market
power. In fact, National was well-run company with its own research lab, and it almost certainly generated more value for GE as an independent subsidiary than as an internal division (Rogers 1980, pp. 97–98). GE continued to give its National division free rein for years after the consent decree.
451. U.S. v. General Electric Company (1926), 272 U.S. 476.
452. Rogers (1980, p. 113).
453. Wise (1985, pp. 134–35).
454. Bright (1949, p. 269). That’s a decline by two-thirds in real terms, from roughly $9.60
of today’s dollars in 1920 to $3.96 in 1933 to $2.73 in 1938. At the same time, the reliability of the bulb had improved.
455. Wise (1985, p. 246).
456. Hounshell (1996, p. 23).
457. Reich (1992, p. 331).
458. O’Sullivan (2006, p. 635).
459. Kline and Lassman (2005).
460. Reich (1992, p. 316).
461. O’Sullivan (2006, p. 636).
462. Kline and Lassman (2005, p. 637).
463. Bright (1949, pp. 388–95).
464. Reich (1985, p. 177).
465. Galambos (1992).
466. Hoddeson (1981).
467. Russell and Vinsel (2017, p. 126). As we will see, after Congress initiated an investigation
of AT&T in 1935, the Federal Communications Commission found plenty to complain about. But it had only good words to say about the company’s efforts in standardization. “The equip- ment and methods used in the Bell System have been standardized to a remarkable extent with resulting economies in manufacture of equipment and operation of telephone plant; flexibility in the interchange of equipment and trained personnel between different parts of the System; and a uniformly high quality of service” (US Federal Communications Commission 1939, p. 584).
468. American Telephone and Telegraph Company, Annual Report of the Directors to the Stockholders for the Year Ending December 31, 1924, pp. 18–19; Hoddeson (1981, p. 541). AT&T in turn owned 98 percent of the stock of Western Electric.
469. Temin and Galambos (1987, p. 13). The spinoff of Bell Labs was part of a larger restruc- turing in which AT&T sold off its international operations to ITT and, as we saw, divested itself of radio broadcasting.
470. Adams and Butler (1999, p. 132); Brooks (1976, pp. 188–92).
616 Notes to Chapter 7
471. Feigenbaum and Gross (2022).
472. When he was an official of the Post Office Department, Daniel C. Roper, Roosevelt’s commerce secretary, had drafted a report calling for telephone to be incorporated into the US Post Office. By 1934, however, he was a supporter of regulation rather than nationalization ( John 2010, p. 411).
473. Brooks (1976, pp. 202–3). 474. Clark (1993).
Chapter 7: Arsenal Again
1. Phillips-Fein (2009, p. 10).
2. In the view of historian Frederick Rudolph, the “Liberty League represented a vigorous and well-stated defense of nineteenth-century individualism and liberalism, a more explicit and determined elaboration of that position than will be found elsewhere in American history” (Rudolph 1950, p. 20).
3. Thomas J. Watson Sr. of IBM is not to be confused with the Thomas A. Watson who aided Alexander Graham Bell.
4. Ferguson (1984, p. 87). 5. Irwin (2017, pp. 413–33). 6. Burns (1956, p. 226).
7. Brinkley (1983).
8. Schlesinger (1960, p. 247). Alan Brinkley (1983, p. 269) argued that Coughlin did not be- come unambiguously antisemitic until 1938.
9. Brinkley (1983, p. 133).
10. “You Have Nothing to Fear But Fear Itself,” The Master Speech Files, 1898, 1910–1945, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum, http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/ _resources/images/msf/msf00903 (accessed August 9, 2022).
11. Schlesinger (1960, p. 631).
12. Irwin (2012).
13. Traditional accounts typically saw the episode through the usual Keynesian lenses and
blamed the recession on contractionary fiscal policy—the end of the veterans bonus and the beginning of payroll taxation for Social Security. In fact, fiscal multipliers during this period were small, and these events would have had a much smaller effect than monetary factors (Romer 1992). Just as Roosevelt has been credited with ending the Great Depression for the wrong reason, he has been blamed for the 1937–1938 recession for the wrong reason.
14. The end of the sterilization program was in fact an afterthought. Morgenthau proposed it as an alternative to running a budget deficit, an idea he vehemently disapproved of. To Mor- genthau’s displeasure, desterilization was simply tacked on to the spending proposals (Hawley 1966, p. 410).
15. Bateman and Backhouse (2011).
16. On April 14, 1938, Roosevelt asked Congress for $3 billion worth of lending and spending, which Congress granted in June; these expenditures weren’t actually made until well after the economy had already begun turning up.
17. Hawley (1966, pp. 387–414); Leuchtenburg (1963, pp. 245–57).
Notes to Chapter 7 617
18. Lee (1988).
19. Carliss Baldwin (1983) points out that this assertion flies in the face of another, more plausible, assertion about corporate planning: that large enterprises need to coordinate high- throughput production through capital-intensive processes and would therefore be loath to channel adjustment onto the output margin. She suggests that inflexible prices have more to do with the need for inflexible contracting in underdeveloped markets and that—as we will see— the development of markets has increasingly impelled firms to use market hedges and greater price flexibility to coordinate production. On this see also Carlton (1982).
20. “The presence of administered prices does not indicate the presence of monopoly nor do market prices indicate the absence of monopoly. In many highly competitive industries, such as the automobile industry, prices are made administratively and held for fairly long periods of time” (Means 1935, p. 1).
21.FranklinD.Roosevelt,PressConference,TheAmericanPresidencyProject,https://www .presidency.ucsb.edu/node/209472 (accessed August 7, 2022). Although it was written almost entirely by Means (Barber 1996, p. 113), the statement claimed to have been “prepared at the President’s request by Henry Morgenthau Jr., secretary of the Treasury; Henry A. Wallace, Sec-