Корпорация и двадцатый век. История американского делового предпринимательства - Richard N. Langlois;
101. G. D. Smith (1988).
102. Chandler (1977, p. 363). This hydropower was small in comparison to the output even of existing government-owned hydro facilities let alone of all potential hydropower, and bauxite was in fact plentiful around the world (Lopatka and Godek 1992). The contemporary economist Donald H. Wallace (1937) argued that Alcoa’s vertical integration was motivated
Notes to Chapter 8 631
by efficiency considerations, including better quality control and more effective coordination between stages. He anticipates some of the famous arguments made by Ronald Coase in the same year.
103. Peck (1961, p. 125). This is, of course, an example of vertical integration because of dy- namic transaction costs.
104. G. D. Smith (1988, pp. 139–46). Rates under the Fordney-McCumber tariff were five cents a pound for ingot and nine cents a pound for sheet. The rates actually came down a penny in the Hawley-Smoot Tariff. Alcoa had almost entirely exited European markets by the Depres- sion, not because of cartel market division but because the company saw export as overreaching its core competences, a not implausible reason given the firm’s functional organizational form. The Canadian subsidiary, which, as we will see, would evolve into the competitor Alcan, held and managed all of Alcoa’s earlier foreign interests.
105. Kolasky (2013, p. 87). Mellon was cleared of fraud but made to pay $800,000 in taxes. Much of the case turned on whether Mellon could deduct $40 million in paintings, many of which he had acquired from the Hermitage collection that Joseph Stalin, desperate for foreign exchange, was selling off to foreign capitalists. The paintings would form the founding collection of the National Gallery of Art in Washington.
106. G. D. Smith (1988, pp. 191–249); Waller (2007).
107. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
108. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), at 430–31.
109. Winerman and Kovacic (2013).
110. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), at 429. In crafting
the Sherman Act, Congress “did not condone ‘good trusts’ and condemn ‘bad’ ones; it forbad all. Moreover, in so doing it was not necessarily actuated by economic motives alone. It is pos- sible, because of its indirect social or moral effect, to prefer a system of small producers, each dependent for his success upon his own skill and character, to one in which the great mass of those engaged must accept the direction of a few. These considerations, which we have sug- gested only as possible purposes of the Act, we think the decisions prove to have been in fact its purposes” (427).
111. G. D. Smith (1988).
112. Arnold (1940, p. 239).
113. Hawley (1966, pp. 247–69); Levinson (2011); Schragger (2004).
114. Ross (1984).
115. Levinson (2011, p. 232).
116. Hawley (1966, pp. 254–58); Phillips Sawyer (2018).
117. Telser (1960); Marvel and McCafferty (1984).
118. Levinson (2011, p. 210).
119. As those of us of a certain age remember, you can trust your car to the man who wears
the star. The big, bright Texaco star. Brand-name capital is especially valuable to consumers in markets like repair services, where there is asymmetric information between the customers and the providers. Applying brand-name capital from one product (gasoline) to other products (repair and maintenance) in situations of asymmetric information is an example of what Wer- nerfelt (1988) calls “umbrella branding.”
120. Marvel (1982).
632 Notes to Chapter 8
121. Blair and Lafontaine (2006, p. 55) observe that “the main advantage of franchising over vertically integrated operations arises from its unique combination of (1) the chain’s compara- tive advantages in creating brand recognition and capturing economies of scale in production, product development, and advertising with (2) the independent entrepreneur’s drive and knowledge of the local market. In other words, in the ideal franchise relationship, each party is allowed to specialize in what it does best.”
122. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
123. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949), at 315. For Douglas, the issue was less lack of competition than “the effect on the community when independents are swallowed up by the trusts and entrepreneurs become employees of absentee owners. Then there is a seri- ous loss in citizenship. Local leadership is diluted. He who was a leader in the village becomes dependent on outsiders for his action and policy. Clerks responsible to a superior in a distant place take the place of resident proprietors beholden to no one.” Robert H. Jackson dissented separately, on the grounds that the court had not bothered to consider the economics of the case. The decision was “but a guess in the dark” (322).
124. Marvel (1995).
125. Olney (1989).
126. Still under the hegemony of the real-bills doctrine, the Fed refused to rediscount the
collateral notes of the independent finance companies, giving the in-house operations a lower cost of capital (Olney 1989, p. 388). The manufacturers wanted the dealers to use the in-house com- panies in large part because they wanted to be able to manage the supply of credit for automobiles during economic downturns.
127. GMAC had its own board of directors and was not a division of GM. After the suit, com- pany officials toyed with the idea of completely internalizing GMAC as a division, but they finally decided that would merely make the Justice Department even
