Корпорация и двадцатый век. История американского делового предпринимательства - Richard N. Langlois;

200. 166 U.S. 290 (1897), at 355.

201. United States v. Joint Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898), at 568.

202. Letwin (1965, p. 174).

203. Sklar (1988, p. 140).

204. Johnson (1959).

205. Kramer (1964); Carstensen (1980).

206. Kramer (1964, p. 291). As Stetson told the Clapp Committee in 1911: “I do not recall

that I have advised the formation of any combination since the decision in the Northern

Notes to Chapter 3 573

Securities case. I do not know what to advise as lawful. I should not advise the formation of any corporation until that is settled. That is one of the things that has unsettled business. Men are stopping; they are not going on. The reason is that they could not get from their trusted counsel advice that it is wise or prudent to go on” (US Senate 1913, p. 960).

207. “To avoid possible trouble with the antitrust laws the new corporation bought the properties rather than the stocks” (Garraty 1960, p. 138).

208. By 1908, the company was being traded on the New York Stock Exchange (Garraty 1960, p. 145).

209. One of the company’s principal defenses in the Taft administration antitrust suit ten years later was that the combination was designed to facilitate the development of foreign mar- kets. Exports of farm machinery totaled $11.2 million in 1900 but declined to $9.9 million in 1901 and to 8.8 million in 1902 (Carstensen 1984, pp. 118 and 253).

210. Yeager (1981); Gordon (1984).

211. The injunction was affirmed by the Supreme Court (Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 [1905]) in a decision important primarily for defining virtually all significant economic activ- ity as interstate commerce. Writing for the majority, Oliver Wendell Holmes held that any activity that is part of an interstate chain of production is subject to federal jurisdiction even if the activity itself (like slaughtering) takes place only within the boundaries of a state (Gordon 1984).

212. Yeager (1981, p. 152). Yeager argues that the government’s victory in Swift was a pyrrhic one, as the judge who issued the injunction explicitly exempted from the list of collusive behav- iors any coordination of quantities intended in good faith to prevent the “overaccumulation” of perishable commodities (p. 184). National Packing was voluntary dissolved during the Taft administration to forestall expected antitrust prosecution (pp. 226–27).

213. Johnson (1959, pp. 580–81).

214. Johnson (1959, pp. 584–88).

215. Garraty (1960).

216. Johnson (1959, pp. 588–89).

217. Wiebe (1959); Kolko (1963, pp. 74–81); Morris (2001, p. 478). 218. Sklar (1988, p. 204).

219. Perkins (1908, p. 156).

220. “The highly developed competitive system gave ruinously low prices at one time and unwarrantedly high prices at another time.” By contrast, an administered average price would be one on which the consumer “can depend in calculating his living expenses or making his business plans” (Perkins 1908, pp. 167–68). It was of course a famous policy of U.S. Steel to try not to vary prices according to short-run supply and demand, a policy with which Perkins was intimately familiar and which contributed to the company’s poor performance in the early twen- tieth century (McCraw and Reinhardt 1989).

221. Perkins (1908, p. 166).

222. Kolko (1963, p. 133); Sklar (1988, p. 198).

223. Johnson (1961); Sklar (1988, pp. 204 ff.); Weinstein (1968, chapter 1).

224. National Civic Federation (1908, p. 195).

225. Weinstein (1968, p. 87).

226. This account follows Sklar (1988), which is the definitive history of the Hepburn

Amendments.

574 Notes to Chapter 3

227. Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908). The Court found that the hatters union had violated the Sherman Act by organizing a product boycott. When the legal dust settled in 1915, the union ended up paying substantial treble damages.

228. Wiebe (1962, p. 81).

229. Martin (1971); Hoogenboom and Hoogenboom (1976, chapter 2).

230. Neal (1969).

231. Vietor (1977) shows that shippers overwhelmingly favored rate regulation and railroads

overwhelmingly opposed it. This is at variance with the well-known narrative of Gabriel Kolko (1965), in which all railroad regulation came into being at the behest of and for the benefit of the railroads.

232. Quoted in Blum (1952, p. 1558).

233. Martin (1971, pp. 128–36).

234. Chandler (1977, p. 186).

235. Letwin (1965, pp. 250–53); Sklar (1988, pp. 364–82).

236. According to the 1912 annual report of Attorney General George W. Wickersham, the

Taft administration initiated 70 suits compared with 62 for all previous post-Sherman admin- istrations combined. (Cited in the New York Times, November 23, 1912, p. 11.) Richard Posner’s data are broken down by year not administration, but in the period 1910–1914, the federal gov- ernment initiated 91 antitrust suits compared with a total of 61 before then. This is the most suits of any five-year period until prosecutions skyrocketed under Thurman Arnold in the 1940s (Posner 1970). See also Bittlingmayer (1992, p. 1705).

237. Letwin (1965, pp. 253–65); Sklar (1988, pp. 146–47).

238. Kramer (1954, pp. 437–38).

239. Jones (1921, pp. 490–92); Sklar (1988, p. 152).

240. US Senate (1913). Perkins testimony is pp. 1088–1145; Brandeis is pp. 1146–1292. 241. US Senate (1913, p. 1094).

242. Sklar (1988, pp. 285–323).

243. US Senate (1913, p. 1162).

244. Hughes (1977, p. 122).

245. US Senate (1913, p. 1289).

246. Yet Marshall himself continued to equate competition with “economic freedom and

enterprise” (Marshall [1920] 1961, VI.iii.2).

247. DiLorenzo and High (1988); McNulty (1967); Morgan (1993, p. 567).

248. Klebaner (1964).

249. Stevens (1914a, 1914b). The eleven were: “Local price-cutting; operation of bogus ‘in-

dependent’ concerns; maintenance of ‘fighting ships’ and ‘fighting brands’; lease, sale, purchase or use of certain articles as a condition of the lease, sale, purchase or use of