Корпорация и двадцатый век. История американского делового предпринимательства - Richard N. Langlois;
Notes to Chapter 3 569
115. Buchanan (1936).
116. Statement of Owen D. Young to the Temporary National Economic Committee Regard- ing the Formation of Capital of the General Electric Company, Washington, DC, May 17, 1939, reprinted as an appendix to Hammond (1941, p. 417).
117. Buchanan (1936, p. 37); Hughes (1979).
118. Moody (1904, pp. 421–28).
119. Bruère (1908).
120. MacDougall (2006); Miranti (2016); Smith (1985); Stehman (1925). Bell had initially
offered his invention to Western Union, which turned him down. But soon Western Union was amassing other patents and patent claims, including those of Elisha Gray and Thomas Edison. The failure of the then-powerful Western Union to integrate into the telephone business may have had to do with the ongoing attempts by Jay Gould to compete with Western Union using railroad rights-of-way after Congress authorized the railroads to run public telegraph systems even if not specified in their corporate charters. In the denouement, Bell held all the telephone patents, and telephone soon came to eclipse telegraphy. As Richard John (2010, p. 160) puts it, the rise of telephony separate from the telegraph resulted from a “combination of a competitive state-oriented political economy that encouraged the chartering of telegraph corporations and a centralized, federally oriented policy that offered a panoply of legal safeguards for the owners of patent rights.”
121. Galambos (1992, p. 100).
122. Garnet (1985, pp. 93–103).
123. About three million each (Brock 1981, p. 121; Brooks 1976, p. 127).
124. As is true in many contexts, networks are often “cliquey” because the density and quality
of the connections matters more than the total number of possible connections (Gulati and Gargiulo 1999; Moazed and Johnson 2016, pp. 170–71). I return to this point in the epilogue in connection with Internet social networks.
125. Mueller (1997).
126. Brock (1981, pp. 114–22).
127. “At the turn of the century, AT&T controlled just 45 percent of the total voting stock of
all the local and regional licensees. By 1910, that figure was more than 80 percent. . . . By 1934, AT&T owned at least 99 percent of the stock in sixteen of the twenty-one operating companies” (MacDougall 2006, p. 307).
128. Garnet (1985, pp. 110–27). 129. Mueller (1997).
130. Garnet (1985, pp. 144–46). 131. Cohen (1991).
132. Brock (1985, pp. 154–58); Brooks (1976, pp. 132–37); Garnet (1985, pp. 152–54).
133. Mueller (1997, p. 145).
134. Chandler (1977, p. 174); Martin (1971, pp. 18–19).
135. As Martin (1971, p. 19) observes of the Southeastern group, “Morgan did not take over
a system and financially rehabilitate it; there was no system before his men brought one forth from the wreckage of the numerous southern railroads after 1893.”
136. Chernow (1990, pp. 88–94); Martin (1971, pp. 99–102). 137. Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904). 138. Letwin (1965, pp. 184–327).
570 Notes to Chapter 3
139. Meyer (1906, p. 246); Letwin (1965, p. 195).
140. Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904), at 373.
141. Meyer (1906, p. 305).
142. Chandler and Salsbury (1971, p. 112).
143. Chernow (1998, p. 555).
144. Hidy and Hidy (1955, p. 477).
145. Chernow (1998, pp. 539–41); Giddens (1955, pp. 112–13).
146. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
147. 173 Federal Reporter 190.
148. 173 Federal Reporter 193.
149. Ise (1926, p. 226).
150. FTC (1917, pp. 143 ff.); Giddens (1955, pp. 134–35). Transportation costs weren’t the only
issue. Copyrights had been registered in the names of the daughter companies, and state laws often forbade companies from operating when they carried a name too close to that of a company al- ready in the state. Both of these made it hard for the “Standards” to compete with one another.
151. Comanor and Scherer (1995).
152. Hidy (1952, p. 423). In the days before the modern theory of finance, people thought of share value in terms of tangible assets not the expected future stream of profits the firm would generate. Differences between the market value of the stock and the accounting value of the tangible assets (sometimes including a measure of goodwill) were denounced as “water.” Rocke- feller made sure his stock wasn’t “watered.”
153. Chandler (1977, p. 422).
154. Chernow (1998, pp. 556–57); Giddens (1955, pp. 136–37). Basuchoudhary et al. argue that the value of Standard Oil stock would have increased even without the breakup, however, and George Bittlingmayer has shown in general that antitrust prosecutions reduce the stock value of corporations, even to the point of causing business cycles (Bittlingmayer 1992).
155. Williamson et al. (1963, pp. 12–14).
156. Hidy (1952, p. 417). “The names of the seven major advisory units at that time reveal their functions—transportation, manufacturing, lubricating oil, cooperage, case and can, ex- port trade, and domestic trade. A production committee reported to John D. Archbold after the Executive Committee decided to embark on producing crude oil. As different problems arose and new functions assumed importance, new committees were created to make investigations and recommendations—on salary schedules, ship construction and operation, and labor dis- putes, to give three examples.”
157. Hidy and Hidy (1955, pp. 323–29).
158. Chernow (1998, p. 558); Gibb and Knowlton (1956, pp. 6–10).
159. de Chazeau and Kahn (1959, pp. 86–99); Johnson (1976).
160. McLean and Haigh (1954, p. 80).
161. Gibb and Knowlton (1956, p. 66); Pratt (1980).
162. de Chazeau and Kahn (1959, p. 115).
163. United States v. American Tobacco Company, 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
164. Chandler
