Корпорация и двадцатый век. История американского делового предпринимательства - Richard N. Langlois;

303. Levinson (2011, p. 113). $1 billion, about $14 billion in 2017 dollars, was roughly 1 percent

of GDP. To put that in some perspective, multiple sources give Amazon’s 2017 revenue as $178 billion, about 0.9 percent of GDP.

304. Dumenil (1995, p. 72).

305. Lippmann (1929, p. 62).

306. Lewis (1922, p. 52).

307. Lewis (1922, p. 100).

308. Although they were a generation apart in age, Lewis and Veblen were well aware of each

other’s work and often riffed on each other in print. Some scholars have seen Lewis’s contribu- tion largely as having popularized Veblen for the generation of the 1920s (Eby 1993, pp. 5–6).

309. Yet Doane cannot hide a grudging suspicion that standardized American cities might be more dynamic and ultimately more pleasant places to live than the textured and idiosyncratic cities of Europe. His interlocutor, the European-born scientist Yavitch, probably also a voice of Lewis, quickly disabuses him of the idea. “‘You,’ said Dr. Yavitch, ‘are a middle-road liberal, and you haven’t the slightest idea what you want. I, being a revolutionist, know exactly what I want—and what I want now is a drink’” (Lewis 1922, p. 101).

310. Skidelsky (1994, p. 240).

311. Lippmann (1929, p. 51); Schumpeter (1950). In Schumpeter’s account, of course, the norms being etched away were not in fact bourgeois in character: they were premodern residues that served to protect bourgeois society. By contrast, as we will see, Keynes became obsessed with overthrowing a Victorian norm that was very much bourgeois: thrift.

312. Commager and Nevins (1976); Morison (1965); Schlesinger (1957). See also Hicks (1960).

313. Shlaes (2013); Silver (1982); Sobel (1998).

314. Scheiber (1960, p. 35). Ironically, perhaps, Hays became better known as the head of the Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America who enforced the famous “Hays Code” of self-censorship on the movie industry. The code had in fact been devised by the American Catholic Church, and the MPPDA embraced it as a way of eluding not only threatened federal censorship but also actual government censorship at the state and local level (Black 1996).

315. Sobel (1998, p. 221).

316. Sobel (1998, p. 250).

317. Hawley (1979, p. 72). 318. Weinstein (1968, p. 230).

598 Notes to Chapter 6

319. Brownlee (2016, p. 113); Cannadine (2006, p. 281).

320. Brownlee (2016, pp. 100–108).

321. “Just as labor cannot be forced to work against its will, so it can be taken for granted that

capital will not work unless the return is worth while. It will continue to retire into the shelter of tax-exempt bonds, which offer both security and immunity from the tax collector” (Mellon 1924, p. 79).

322. Sobel (1998, p. 311). For inflation conversion see Samuel H. Williamson, “Seven Ways to Compute the Relative Value of a U.S. Dollar Amount, 1790 to Present,” MeasuringWorth, 2022, https://www.measuringworth.com/uscompare/ (accessed August 17, 2022).

323. Kennedy (1980, p. 112).

324. Desai, Dharmapala, and Fung (2007).

325. Means (1930, p. 586).

326. Means (1930, p. 572).

327. Lipartito and Morii (2010, pp. 1056–57).

328. Ott (2011, pp. 156–57).

329. Even after the Depression destroyed many family empires, only 30 percent or so of the

largest two hundred corporations in the US were not owned by large blockholders or by other corporations, and there is reason to think that coalitions of stockholders had potential control even in many of the firms with diffuse ownership (Leech 1987).

330. Hughes (1979, p. 160).

331. Bonbright and Means (1932, p. 226). 332. Neufeld (2016).

Chapter 6: The Real Catastrophe

1. Galbraith (1955, p. 168).

2. “Time has not been kind to the school of thought that blames the Depression on the stock-market crash” (Temin 1989, p. 43).

3. Romer (1990, p. 597).

4. Whaples (1995, p. 143).

5. Keynes actually had little or no influence on American policy during the Depression,

which was in fact animated by a homegrown folk Keynesianism. I treat Keynes more carefully later in the postwar context.

6. Edwards (2018); Romer (1992). Faced with the new consensus among economic historians, Eric Rauchway has recently attempted to resuscitate the conventional view that Keynes and Roosevelt saved capitalism—now, astoundingly, because of the monetarist policies they advocated and enacted (Rauchway 2015).

7. Bernanke (1983).

8. Meltzer (2003, pp. 144–45).

9. Chandler (1958, p. 329).

10. Ahamed (2009, p. 171).

11. Toma (2013).

12. Ahamed (2009, pp. 173–74); Meltzer (2003, pp. 145–54). 13. Eichengreen (1996).

Notes to Chapter 6 599

14. Timberlake (2007, p. 339). Miller was well-acquainted with fellow Laughlin student H. Parker Willis, who was still advising Carter Glass, now head of the Senate Banking Committee. When Glass had been on the Fed Board ex officio as Treasury Secretary, Willis was the Board secretary.

15. Chandler (1958, pp. 291–331).

16. White (1990, p. 69).

17. Ahamed (2009, pp. 274–75). Contrary to popular belief, however, margin requirements

were not low during this period, and they were generally on the increase over the decade, espe- cially in the months before the crash (Smiley and Keehn 1988).

18. Hoover (1952b, p. 9).

19. Meltzer (2003, pp. 203–5).

20. Ahamed (2009, pp. 278).

21. Field (2012, p. 46).

22. White (1990).

23. Ahamed (2009, pp. 295–300).

24. Chandler (1958, pp. 454–55).

25. Romer (1993, p. 27).

26. Friedman and Schwartz (1963, pp. 279–84).

27. Miller (1935, p. 453).

28. Miller (1935, p. 454).

29. Friedman and Schwartz (1963, pp. 254–63); Meltzer (2003, pp. 235–41).

30. Bordo and Wheelock (2013, p 84); Toma (2013, pp. xii-xix).

31. Eichengreen (1996, pp. 222–23).

32. Chandler (1971, pp. 72–73).

33. Meltzer (2003, p. 243).

34. Meltzer (1976, p. 462).

35. Samuel H. Williamson, “Daily Closing Value of the Dow Jones Average, 1885 to Present,”

Measuring Worth, https://www.measuringworth.com/datasets/DJA/index.php (accessed April 7, 2019).

36. Allen (1931,