Корпорация и двадцатый век. История американского делового предпринимательства - Richard N. Langlois;
105. Carosso (1970, pp. 219ff.); Martin (1971).
106. Schaffer (1994, p. 33).
107. Higgs (1987, pp. 116–21).
108. The Railroad Administration kept rates low and wages high, necessitating a transfer
of some $1.4 billion from the Treasury during the 27 months of federal control (Healy 1944, p. 536).
109. Rockoff (2005, p. 329).
110. Cuff (1978, p. 47); Higgs (1987, p. 138); Kennedy (1980, p. 124).
111. Koistinen (1997, p. 211).
112. Eisner (2014, pp. 59 and 61).
113. Koistinen (1997, p. 198).
114. Koistinen (1997, p. 233).
115. Eisner (2000, pp. 64–65).
116. Cuff (1973, p. 225).
117. Rockoff (2005, p. 238).
118. Cuff and Urofsky (1970, p. 295); Tugwell (1927, p. 365).
119. Miron and Romer (1990, p. 337).
120. Rockoff (2012, p. 133). Note also that national income is calculated in dollar terms, not
in terms of physical units, and it is far from clear how meaningful are the wartime prices used to make the calculation.
121. Rockoff (2005, p. 238).
122. Rockoff (2012, p. 140).
123. To put that in perspective: US GDP in 1919 was $79 billion. The $32 billion expenditure
would be something like $444 billion in 2016 dollars. The (much-longer-lasting) US incursion into Afghanistan and Iraq in the twenty-first century has been costing disputed numbers of trillions of dollars, against US GDP in 2016 of $18.6 trillion. See Louis Johnston and Samuel H. Williamson, “What Was the U.S. GDP Then?,” Measuring Worth, http://www.measuringworth .org/usgdp/ (accessed November 19, 2017).
124. Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 221); Rockoff (2005, p. 316). 125. J. M. Clark (1931).
126. For instances of this, see for example Frothingham (1927, p. 131).
127. Link (1954, p. 195). The tax on munitions makers was made retroactive to the beginning of 1916 to make sure that the firms could not raise their prices to compensate. Almost all of the tax was paid by Du Pont (Chandler and Salsbury 1971, p. 402).
128. Gilbert (1970, p. 79).
129. Rockoff (2005, p. 321). See also Federica Genovese, Kenneth Scheve, and David Stasav- age, “Comparative Income Taxation Database,” Stanford University Libraries, February 28, 2014, http://data.stanford.edu/citd.
130. Rockoff (2012, p. 329).
131. Scheidel (2017); Scheve and Stasavage (2016).
132. Kennedy (1980, pp. 100ff.).
133. Meyer (2017, p. 288).
134. Kennedy (1980, p. 104).
135. Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 205).
136. Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 220); Meltzer (2003, pp. 73 ff.).
137. Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 216).
138. Samuel H. Williamson, “The Annual Consumer Price Index for the United States,
1774–2015,” Measuring Worth, http://www.measuringworth.com/uscpi/ (accessed Novem- ber 20, 2017).
139. Much of this portrait of the early American automobile industry follows Langlois and Robertson (1995, chapter 4).
140. Goddard (2000); Maxim (1937). Pope attempted to reestablish itself as a maker of gasoline-powered vehicles, but this met with little success. The firm collapsed in 1914 following the death in 1909 of founder Colonel Albert A. Pope, though bicycle operations were acquired by the Westfield Manufacturing Company, whose new facilities in Massachusetts made bicycles and even munitions for the war effort. Pope’s Hartford plant was taken over by a machine-tool company called Pratt & Whitney. The company’s signature brand—the Columbia bicycle— lives on as intellectual property, nowadays in the form of a retro-design for enthusiasts.
141. Pound (1934, chapter 4).
142. Klepper (2016).
143. Langlois (2018, pp. 1059–60).
144. Klepper (2016, pp. 75–76).
145. Hounshell (1984, p. 224).
146. Hounshell (1984).
147. Ames and Rosenberg (1965). On this see also Langlois (2003a).
148. Hounshell (1984, p. 252).
149. Raff and Summers (1987).
150. Older factories had been laid out for centralized water or steam power. Paul David
(1990) has argued that the redesign of factories was essential to the productivity improvements implied by the development of small electric motors. In David’s story, the delay in adapting factories accounts in large part for the slow pace at which industry, and the economy as a whole, benefited from the nineteenth-century innovation of electric power.
151. Williams et al. (1993).
152. A widely repeated, if perhaps apocryphal, anecdote illustrates the point. Ford engineer Charles Sorenson “recalled that when Charles Morgana sent out specifications for a
Notes to Chapter 4 585
Ford-designed machine tool to machine tool manufacturers, the latter often came back to Mor- gana saying that there must have been an error because the machine could not do what it was supposed to do. Morgana would then show the tool builders that no mistake had been made because the Ford-designed and Ford-built prototype could indeed turn out the specified num- ber of units within the specified limits of precision. ‘So it went with the thousand pieces of machinery that we bought,’ concluded Sorensen” (Hounshell 1984, p. 231).
153. Nevins and Hill (1954, pp. 458–61). Ford turned the now-empty Keim facility in Buffalo into an assembly plant.
154. “Ford Must Distribute $19,000,000, but May Build Smelting Plant,” Automotive Indus- tries, February 13, 1919, p. 391.
155. Nevins and Hill (1954, pp. 568–69).
156. Spence (1981).
157. Nevins and Hill (1954, p. 282, emphasis original).
158. Goddard (2000); Maxim (1937).
159. EVC did in fact make some gasoline-powered vehicles, a legacy of Pope’s sideline.
160. In 1916 “Automobile” was changed to “Automotive” to bring on board engineers working
with other self-propelled vehicles like airplanes and boats.
161. Barnes (1921); Thompson (1954).
162. Thompson (1954, p. 9).
163. Nevins and Hill (1954, pp. 211–13). Leland had been brought in before Ford left, and the
rivalry this created was one motivation for Ford’s departure. 164. Leland and Millbrook (1966).
165. Arnold and Faurote (1915).
166. Hounshell (1984, p. 260).
167. “Exposition Auto Show the World’s Greatest,” Los Angeles Times, May 2, 1915, p. VII6. More than 4,000 Model Ts were made at the
