Корпорация и двадцатый век. История американского делового предпринимательства - Richard N. Langlois;
88. Gordon Moore, “Cramming more Components onto Integrated Circuits,” Electronics, April 19, 1965. Bloom et al. (2020, p. 1116) calculate that the doubling time—remarkably constant over some fifty years—was actually two years, which works out to an implied exponential rate of growth of 35 percent per year.
89. Bresnahan and Greenstein (1999).
Chapter 2: Origins
1. Bensel (2000, p. 6).
2. On the political economy of money and banking in the post–Civil War era, see Friedman and Schwartz (1963, chapter 2), Unger (1964), Frieden (2015, chapter 2), and Calomiris and Haber (2014, pp. 175 ff.). The classic history of the greenbacks is Mitchell (1903).
Notes to Chapter 2 557
3. Friedman and Schwartz (1963, pp. 44–45).
4. British colonies were typically on gold, but India was on a silver standard (Frieden 2015, p. 109).
5. Unger (1959, pp. 47–48).
6. Bordo and Kydland (1995); Bordo and Rockoff (1996).
7. Baack and Ray (1983); Irwin (1998a); Taussig (1910, p. 138). The Civil War dramatically
increased the demand for federal revenue, and also removed from the scene Southern opposi- tion to tariffs. But the Morrill Act was in fact initiated before the election of Abraham Lincoln. It placed duties on iron and wool in an explicit effort to attract Pennsylvania and Western states to the Republican Party. Once the war began, however, Congress rapidly ratcheted tariff rates up for revenue purposes.
8. Frieden (2015, p. 65); Irwin and Temin (2001).
9. Bensel (1990, p. 307); Frieden (2015, p. 65); Unger (1959, pp. 53ff ).
10. Unger (1959, pp. 65–66).
11. Friedman and Schwartz (1963, pp. 48–49).
12. Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 83).
13. Taussig (1910, p. 146).
14. As first pointed out by Abba Lerner (1936).
15. Irwin (2007).
16. Friedman and Schwartz (1963, chapter 3); Higgs (1971, chapter 2); Frieden (2015, chapter 3).
The velocity of money also declined slightly during this period. Although some have referred to the late nineteenth century as one “long depression,” in fact, apart from some severe recessions, rapid economic growth continued throughout the period of deflation. For the most part, the fall- ing price level was an instance of what George Selgin (1997) has called “benign deflation.”
17. Rockoff (1990).
18. Fisher (1896). See also Rockoff (1990, pp. 752–53).
19. Fogel and Rutner (1972); North (1966, pp. 137–48).
20. Frieden (1997; 2015, chapter 2). This had been noticed before. “It is hardly accidental,”
wrote Richard Hofstadter, “that the products of the American staple-growing regions showing the highest discontent were the products most dependent on exports” (Hofstadter 1955, pp. 51–52).
21. Higgs (1971, p. 99).
22. Frieden (2015, pp. 106–7).
23. Higgs (1971, pp. 87–90).
24. Friedman and Schwartz (1963, chapter 3); Unger (1964, pp. 329–30). The supply of silver
was also shifting out because a number of countries around the world were adopting the gold standard and demonetizing silver.
25. Bensel (2000, p. 288).
26. Wiebe (1967, pp. 52–53).
27. Wiebe (1967, pp. 47–48).
28. Anne Mayhew (1972) has stressed this argument. See also Higgs (1987, p. 81).
29. North (1978, p. 972).
30. Hughes (1977). On this see also Sylla (1991).
31. And this at a time when incorporation had been abolished by the French Revolution and
was still forbidden in Britain by the Bubble Act of 1720 (Maier 1993).
558 Notes to Chapter 2
32. Hansmann and Kraakman (2000b).
33. Seavoy (1978, p. 38).
34. Ribstein (1991). This is not the same thing as saying that something like the corporate
form could be (or could have been) had purely through contract. Contracts create rights in personam, that is, against specific named individuals. By contrast, the creation of corporate person implies many aspects of rights in rem, that is, rights in perpetuity against an indefinite number of unidentified individuals. So the construction of corporate personhood through private ordering would require some noncontractual elements of law, notably the law of trusts at the very least (Hansmann and Kraakman 2000a).
35. Anderson and Tollison (1983) claim that limited liability provisions were in fact enforceable in English law in the eighteenth century, even though they were little used because limited liability conferred few transaction-cost benefits in a world of closely held companies with face-to-face transactions. Whether the law ought to enforce claims of limited tort liability as against merely contractual liability—that is, limited liability against “involuntary” creditors—is a complex ques- tion; but that is not the same question as whether corporate law, unaided by a monarch or a leg- islature, could or did permit limited tort liability in addition to limited contractual liability.
36. The quote is from Getzler and Macnair (2005, p. 272). See also Anderson and Tollison (1983). Ron Harris (1994) has argued that the Bubble Act itself—actually initiated before the bursting of the South Sea Bubble—was but one manifestation of a general hostility to incorpo- ration during this period.
37. DuBois (1938, p. 217).
38. Handlin and Handlin (1945).
39. Wright (2011, p. 225).
40. Sylla et al. (1987).
41. Wallis (2005). Of course, taxpayers would retain a contingent liability in the event the
venture failed.
42. Maier (1993, p. 54). In this period, state charters did not distinguish among governmental,
nonprofit, or commercial
