Очерки истории Франции XX–XXI веков. Статьи Н. Н. Наумовой и ее учеников - Коллектив авторов

In the autumn of 1944, Thorez had twice requested de Gaulle’s authorisation to return to France, but the General had ignored his messages.[350]

On 21 October Georgy Dimitrov, former Comintern secretary-general and future head of Bulgaria’s first post-war government, then also in exile in the USSR, wrote to Molotov about this one-sided correspondence. While a campaign for Thorez’s return had started in France, said Dimitrov, ‘hostile elements’ were spreading the ‘myth’ of his desertion in 1939 and claiming that he had had links with the Germans. Meanwhile, Dimitrov claimed, Thorez continued to enjoy Soviet hospitality, while the Soviet press remained ‘totally silent’ on the problem, creating ‘a very embarrassing situation not only for Thorez but also for ourselves’, which could best be remedied via an article on the subject (which Dimitrov submitted for Molotov’s approval) in Pravda. Molotov’s comments, handwritten on the draft, indicate a clear intention to apply gentle pressure on de Gaulle: ‘The article does not explain clearly where the problem lies. Why can Thorez not return? Who is refusing him entry?’[351]

This form of indirect influence – and, no doubt, the situation in France produced results within a week. On 28 October – the same day as the decree dissolving the militias in France – de Gaulle wired Roger Garreau, France’s ambassador in Moscow, to say that ‘The government has decided to quash the verdicts of French courts-martial reached before 18 June 1940 and relating to persons who subsequently took part in the national Resistance movement. This decision gives M. Maurice Thorez the right of re-entry into France. You may inform him of it. However, before a visa can be delivered a few days’ wait will be necessary until the decree is published in the Journal Officiel.’[352]

During this wait, on 19 November, Thorez had a long conversation with Stalin. The length of their meeting, the detail of Stalin’s instructions on how the Communists were to behave in liberated France, and the presence of both Molotov and Lavrenti Beria all indicate the extreme importance placed in Moscow on the PCF’s activities – as well as the strengths and limitations of Stalin’s view of French politics under the GPRF.[353]For Stalin, ‘the most import ant question was how to get through the current difficult period when the Communists were not masters in France, and counted enemies as well as friends; and how to rally their own forces while preventing the forces of reaction from rallying theirs.’ Stalin punctuated the conversation with questions to Thorez, whose answers he used as the basis for his own orders. At first, he simply asked Thorez how he viewed the French situation, while expressing revealing perplexity that former prisoners of war (such as Bidault or Juin) had been given important posts in the GPRF. Thorez’s answer focused on the PCF’s relations with the French Socialists, and noted the SFIO leadership’s refusal to co-operate with the PCF despite the Communists’ success in winning working-class Socialists to their cause and despite Socialist commitments to ‘unity of action’. The Socialists, complained Thorez, were denigrating the PCF’s war record by suggesting that their heroic role in the struggle against the Germans dated only from 1941.

Stalin’s reply broached the central theme of his advice to Thorez by stressing the PCF’s continuing need for allies against the ‘forces of reaction’ and warning against excessive criticism of the SFIO. De Gaulle, Stalin argued, might well try to isolate the PCF and to act against the Communists; even if personally unwilling, ‘he will be pressed to do so by the Americans and the British, who want to create a reactionary government in France, as they do everywhere they can’. The Communists, he stressed, ‘are not strong enough to take on the struggle against the reactionary forces on their own’, and should therefore seek allies among Radicals, Socialists and ‘other elements’ to form a ‘bloc against the forces of reaction’, allowing the PCF to ‘defend itself now and, when the situation had changed, to go onto the attack’. For that reason, they ‘should not seek to identify who, among the Socialists, said what and when against the Soviet Union’. Even if ‘we know the Socialists well’ as ‘the left wing of the bourgeoisie’, the overriding need now was to avoid the PCF’s isolation. The bloc should also create close but discreet links with trade unions and with youth movements. ‘The youth movement’, added Stalin, ‘should not be called the Communist youth. Some people are frightened of flags, and this should be taken into consideration.’

Perhaps the most remarkable moment in the conversation came when Thorez mentioned that ‘the patriotic militias that had formed the main force of the Resistance under the Occupation’ had, for the moment, kept their arms. In reply, Stalin warned Thorez to: take account of the fact that there now existed in France a government recognised by the Allied powers. In these conditions it was difficult for the Communists to have their own armed forces alongside those of the regular army, as their need for such detachments was now open to question. As long as there was no Provisional Government, and as long as no zones to the rear of the battle-front fell under the authority of such a government, there was some point in the existence of such units. But what was their use now that there was a government with an army? Such arguments could be used by the Communists’ enemies, and would seem convincing to the average Frenchman. The position of the Communist Party was therefore weak and would continue to be so as long as it kept its armed forces; its position was simply hard to defend. That