Григорий Явлинский - Периферийный авторитаризм. Как и куда пришла Россия

Поэтому правы те, кто считает, что этот режим исторически обречен; что он не сможет найти правильные формы и пути адаптации к реальным условиям – если, конечно, сами эти условия не изменятся в катастрофическом для мира направлении. Если весь мир не погрузится в пучину экономического хаоса и военных конфликтов, если он сможет нащупать путь к устойчивому росту в условиях мира и безопасности, то новое поколение российского политического класса – те, кому сегодня 20-30 лет, – не смогут долго сохранять и поддерживать политическую систему России в ее нынешнем виде, не поставив при этом страну под угрозу распада и разрушения.

А угроза такого развития событий есть, и она вполне реальна. Нынешняя система уже привела к трагическим последствиям, поставив страну на грань полномасштабной кровопролитной войны. Снова начинает работать порочный круг, когда пропаганда наличия внешней угрозы порождает или усиливает эти угрозы, а сверхусилия в военном строительстве через деградацию экономической базы снижают, а не укрепляют фактическую способность противостоять внешним и внутренним угрозам безопасности. Тем самым трагический фарс постепенно перерастает в реальную трагедию страны и общества.

Таким образом, система периферийного авторитаризма не просто оказывается неспособной решить главную историческую задачу России в XXI веке – преодолеть разрыв между нею и развитыми странами мира. Она начинает угрожать самому существованию страны в ее нынешнем виде, делая ее лакомой добычей для всякого рода экстремистов, политических мародеров и организованного криминала, которые способны превратить государство в пустую оболочку, лишенную способности выполнять даже самые базовые свои функции. О дальнейших перспективах развития событий при таком сценарии можно только догадываться.

Что же касается вопроса о том, есть ли из нынешнего трагического фарса выход в сторону модернизации и развития, то он по-прежнему остается открытым.

Summary for English readers

The key to understanding Russia’s present political system is a simple notion that it is neither a whim of history brought about by an individual will of Russia’s current leader nor an accidental deviation from the presumably natural path of building Western-style political institutions and practices. Indeed, the last two decades in Russian history did contain some important choices, which the country made, either consciously or unconsciously. Essentially, however, it was a prolonged but consistent process of authoritarian bureaucracy consolidating its self-perpetuating grip on political and economic power in the country. That is the gist and the essence of this book.

True enough, the entrenching power of centralized bureaucracy in Russia according to its ages-old tradition is embodied in the Kremlin, and the man who reigns in it at a particular moment, whatever his name may be. That gives Russian autocracy a distinct personal touch, with the man presiding over the state machine defining the style and agenda of bureaucratic rule. Nevertheless, the real power vests with the bureaucracy itself, which may be shaped and used for arbitrary ends though within limits, and able to resist the strongest pressures when its vital power instincts are infringed upon.

That is the reason why this book, which I hope tells a lot about “Putin’s Russia”, may appear too brief on Putin himself. Despite the nearly mystical power that both his loyalists and many of his opponents ascribe to him, he is essentially an integral part of Russia’s present political system, its product and explanation. His mindset is that of a typical member of Russia’s privileged bureaucratic class slightly influenced by peculiar secret-service fancies. A going theory that he by his personal will turned back the tide of 1990s and transmuted a young Russian democracy into a dictatorial state is nothing but a myth. In fact the opposite may be true: his power is a reflection and a direct continuation of the system of government and trends which materialized in 1990s.

It was exactly the time when the Soviet-era administrative elite, which had presided over the collapse of the Soviet Union and had taken control over what remained there after its demise, did not risk letting itself divide and create competing centers of power. Power in Russia remained undivided, the ruling group was subject neither to control from beneath or from competing rivals, nor to the possibility of replacement or rotation through collective decision of the privileged classes. Its power was limited only by the technical feasibility of policies to be implemented, not by binding obligations or external checks. Competition in political life was tolerated as long as rival groups aspired for the opportunity to influence the government, but not for the power it held. The single centre of undivided and unquestionable power (in the 1990s it was then-President Yeltsin) used competing groups below as checks and counterweights against each other, but its own power could not be either checked or counterbalanced.

It is exactly this kind of political system that was inherited and conserved by Putin. Moreover, he has stripped this system of unnecessary disguise and hypocrisy, and consolidated it, as well as its self-evaluation, thus making it more assertive. In fact, his personal contribution to the system could be summed up as two important things.

For one thing, he has determined the direction of its further course. As a possibility he could have opted to try changing the path of the system’s evolution towards laying the foundations for political competition and Western-style democracy, if he chose so. He did not do that for at least two reasons.

First, nobody really pushed him to do that. Neither the Russian political class at large, which had no aspirations for the role of the modernizer of Russian society. Nor the West, which talked to Putin as a man who was presiding over a country that had lost the Cold War and hence the right to participate in deciding the rules of international and even its own domestic political affairs.

Second, he himself being a true son of the old Soviet ruling elite (the siloviki part of it) did not believe in the power of political competition, considering it harmful to the unity of the Russian nation and to the strength of national statehood.

Another thing, which Putin contributed to the Yeltsintime political system, were his efforts to nullify elements that were alien to authoritarian system, that is 1) competitive elections and 2) independent private big business capable of gaining political power (the so-called “oligarchy”). In both cases he made a considerable advance in this direction even before the fresh round of authoritarian restyling of Russian politics in 2013-2014. The latter made the goal of building a near-classical autocracy based on “one nation – one leader” principle not only feasible but rather an inevitable achievement. By the time this book is published elections at almost every level have come to produce results that are 95% predictable, while the remaining 5% could be managed by other means or simply neglected. On the other hand, big private business not linked to big government survives, if it does, as a poor relic of the so-called “oligarchy” of the 1990s, and the last thing it wants to be thought of is its having any political ambitions.

As a result, what we are witnessing now in Russia is a consolidated, fully-fledgedautocracywith an indisputable leader presiding over privileged bureaucracy and a very large strata of public and semi-public workers, as well as straight dependents of the state, who rely on the government for their income and protection against all sorts of menace, both real and imaginary.

The reasons for that are plentiful, but one important factor, which is stressed in this book as being of utmost importance, is that contemporary Russia that emerged on the ruins of a former communist superpower is a peripheral and subordinated part of the global capitalist civilization, of its economy, technologies and politics.

Russia’s role in the global economy is limited to that of a supplier of hydrocarbons (and a small portion of other primary products) to more advanced and wealthy nations, with little chance of breaking the vicious circle oflow position, poor efficiency and low status. The result is an almost complete absence of sovereign business class, self-conscious and independent from government bureaucracy, which would be eager to integrate itself into global business aristocracy. Hence little motivation can be expected in the Russian political class to change domestic political and business rules in order to gain competitive power and international advantages.

The drive towards fully-fledged autocracy has been made easier by the weak political position of the country and its low economic status. Lack of powerful economic and political leverage intensifies Russia’s frictions with global political leaders, who tend to impose their will on the rest of the world. The resulting frustration nourishes authoritarian political trends and the forces promoting them while undermining the position of those advocating an open and free political system.

Moreover, the psychological heritage of a former superpower’s past glory and fancy ideas of a global mission come into unbearable contradiction with Russia’s dependent and subordinate position within the global hierarchy. That makes the Russian elite resent the rules being imposed on it by the established world leaders as well as those who are trying to do it. Putin’s anti-Western mood stems not so much from his personal views and tastes, but rather from the general sense of discomfort of the entire Russian establishment, aspiring to join the upper ranks of the world elite but failing to produce solid good reason to demand that.

The recent crisis in Russia-Ukraine and Russia-West relations should be analyzed with a broader view of the changing situation in Russia. In fact, it is only a piece of a bigger puzzle, an outer extension of deep divisions and frustrations tormenting the collective mind of the Russian political class.

It is true that major decisions in the Russian government system are made at the very top. Nevertheless, the top relies on reports from a broader range of administrators and functionaries who form the mood and presuppose the range of possible decisions. Political class at large is not a passive recipient of decisions made at the top – rather it determines their direction and range.

An acute and menacing crisis in Russia’s relations with the West resulting from Putin’s rejection of rules of behavior which are considered by the West to be universal and obligatory, is to a large degree his personal choice reflecting his personal vision. Nevertheless, the decision was not completely personal and free – it came in the logic of consolidating the autocratic government system which made systemic break with the West inevitable. Moreover, the need for consolidation of the system came out of its obvious inability to solve the problems Russia faces.

The control of the very top over the entire system, its governability and sense of stability have been undermined by a sharp reduction of growth rates and mounting difficulties in extracting dictatorial rent from the economy to be distributed among the privileged bureaucracy and thus uphold the autocratic rule. That produced the need to find new instruments to consolidate the system like more official indoctrination and control over media, accentuating real and imaginary dangers from external and internal “enemies”, fostering the feeling of being victimized by a hostile world.

Hence, the situation could not be reversed easily by a single decision, even if Putin were prepared to make it. To turn the tide back, systemic changes in the mindset and world vision of the Russian political class are a necessary condition. This is a fundamentally difficult task that would take years to solve, but there is no other way to achieve a lasting settlement. Attempts to solve the issue by sanctions and private deals with Putin will be short-lived and ultimately fruitless. The only practical way to prevent Russia from fundamentally isolating itself from the West is to make it choose a difficult and painful road of converging with the mainstream of global capitalism and adapting to its realities and to wage an honest dialogue with the Russian political class at large.

Автор выражает признательность за поддержку при подготовке книги, участие в обсуждении и редактировании рукописи В.В. Когану-Ясному, В.Г. Швыдко, А.В. Космынину, а также редактору Ю.А. Здоровову.

Примечания

1

См. об этом, в частности, «Вопросы экономики». № 9. 2007. С. 19-26.

2

Желающие могут, например, обратиться к статье С. Гуриева и О. Цывинского «Ratio economica: Демократичный кризис», где дается далеко не полный, но обширный перечень таких гипотез («Ведомости», 28.08.2012, №161 (3175)).

3

Такого рода авторитарные режимы, иногда называемые в западной литературе «диктатурой развития», в ХХ веке рассматривались ими самими как попытка вырвать свои страны из мирового пояса отсталости и попытаться приблизиться к развитому ядру мировой системы или даже войти в него. Одной из таких диктатур можно, по-видимому, считать и СССР, по крайней мере на некоторых этапах его исторического пути.