Обратный эффект санкций. Как санкции меняют мир не в интересах США - Агата Демаре
576
Расчеты автора с использованием данных Economist Intelligence Unit, январь 2022 года.
577
Mary Amiti, Stephen J. Redding, and David Weinstein, “The Impact of the 2018 Trade War on U. S. Prices and Welfare”, Centre for Economic Performance, March 2019, http://cep. lse. ac. uk/pubs/download/dp1603. pdf.
578
“How America Might Wield Its Ultimate Weapon of Mass Disruption”, Economist, August 15, 2020, https://www. economist. com/business/2020/08/13/how-america-might-wield-its-ultimate-weapon-of-mass-disruption.
579
“American National-Security Maximalism Can Be Self-Defeating”, Economist, August 22, 2020, https://www. economist. com/united-states/2020/08/20/american-national-security-maximalism-can-be-self-defeating.
580
“America’s Latest Salvo Against Huawei Is Aimed at Chipmaking in China”, Economist, May 23, 2020, https://www. economist. com/business/2020/05/23/americas-latest-salvo-against-huawei-is-aimed-at-chipmaking-in-china.
581
“Measuring Distortions in International Markets: The Semiconductor Value Chain”, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, December 12, 2019, https://doi. org/10.1787/8fe4491d-en.
582
Antonio Varas and Raj Varadarajan, “How Restrictions to Trade with China Could End US Leadership in Semiconductors”, Boston Consulting Group, March 2020, https://image-src. bcg. com/Images/BCG-How-Restricting-Trade-with-China-Could-End-US-Semiconductor-Mar‐2020_tcm9–240526. pdf.
583
Ian Fergusson and Karen Sutter, “U. S. Export Control Reforms and China: Issues for Congress”, Congressional Research Service, accessed October 13, 2020, https://crsreports. congress. gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11627.
584
“Global Semiconductor Sales Increase 24 Percent Year-to-Year in October; Annual Sales Projected to Increase 26 Percent in 2021, Exceed $600 Billion in 2022”, Semiconductor Industry Association, December 3, 2021, https://www. semiconductors. org/global-semiconductor-sales-increase‐24-year-to-year-in-october-annual-sales-projected-to-increase‐26-in‐2021-exceed‐600-billion-in‐2022.
585
Chris Miller, “America Is Going to Decapitate Huawei”, New York Times, September 15, 2020, https://www. nytimes. com/2020/09/15/opinion/united-states-huawei. html.
586
Aurélien Duthoit, “China: Riding the Silicon Ox?”, Euler Hermes, February 9, 2021, https://www. eulerhermes. com/en_global/news-insights/economic-insights/China-Riding-the-silicon-ox. html.
587
Lauly Li, Cheng Ting-Fang, and Yifan Yu, “How a Handful of US Companies Can Cripple Huawei’s Supply Chain”, Nikkei Asia, August 19, 2020, https://asia. nikkei. com/Spotlight/Huawei-crackdown/How-a-handful-of-US‐companies-can-cripple-Huawei-s-supply-chain.
588
Varas and Varadarajan, “How Restrictions to Trade with China Could End US Leadership in Semiconductors”.
589
“The 2020 SIA Factbook: Your Source for Semiconductor Industry Data”, Semiconductor Industry Association, accessed October 13, 2020, https://www. semiconductors. org/the‐2020-sia-factbook-your-source-for-semiconductor-industry-data.
590
“Notes from a CSIS Virtual Event”, Center for Strategic and International Studies.
591
Chad Bown, “The US Is Trying to Use Export Controls to Restrict Huawei’s Access to Semiconductors”, Peterson Institute for International Economics, October 13, 2020, https://www. piie. com/research/piie-charts/us-trying-use-export-controls-restrict-huaweis-access-semiconductors.
592
Chad Bown, “How Trump’s Export Curbs on Semiconductors and Equipment Hurt the US Technology Sector”, Peterson Institute for International Economics, September 28, 2020, https://www. piie. com/blogs/trade-and-investment-policy-watch/how-trumps-export-curbs-semiconductors-and-equipment-hurt-us.
593
Li, Ting-Fang, and Yu, “How a Handful of US Companies Can Cripple Huawei’s Supply Chain”.
594
Li, Ting-Fang, and Yu, “How a Handful of US Companies Can Cripple Huawei’s Supply Chain”.
595
“Semiconductor Design and Manufacturing: Achieving Leading-Edge Capabilities”, McKinsey & Company, August 20, 2020, https://www. mckinsey. com/industries/advanced-electronics/our-insights/semiconductor-design-and-manufacturing-achieving-leading-edge-capabilities.
596
Cheng Ting-Fang and Lauly Li, “China’s SMIC Stockpiles Chip Equipment to Counter US Restrictions”, Nikkei Asia, September 30, 2020, https://asia. nikkei. com/Politics/International-relations/US-China-tensions/China-s-SMIC‐stockpiles-chip-equipment-to-counter-US‐restrictions.
597
Alex Webb, “The $150 Million Machine with $200 Billion at Stake for China”, Bloomberg, January 16, 2020, https://www. bloomberg. com/opinion/articles/2020–01–16/dutch-ban-raises-stakes-in-u-s-china-technology-war.
598
Планаризация — удаление неровностей с поверхности полупроводниковой пластины с помощью химических и механических методов. (Прим. пер.)
599
Ting-Fang and Li, “China’s SMIC Stockpiles Chip Equipment”.
600
“Measuring Distortions in International Markets”, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
601
“Measuring Distortions in International Markets”, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
602
“Semiconductor Design and Manufacturing”, McKinsey & Company.
603
Chad Bown, “Export Controls: America’s Other National Security Threat”, Peterson Institute for International Economics, May 2020, https://www. piie. com/system/files/documents/wp20–8. pdf.
604
“H. R.5040—Export Control Reform Act of 2018”, U. S. Congress, April 17, 2018, https://www. congress. gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/5040/text.
605
В оригинале используется идиома «more bark than bite» (происходящая от английской поговорки «собака, которая громко лает, обычно не кусается»), то есть «не так плох (или «не так страшен»), как кажется». Близким по смыслу значением обладают в зависимости от контекста идиомы «не так страшен черт, как его малюют» или «у страха глаза велики». Иными словами, закон оказался не так страшен, как могло показаться на первый взгляд. (Прим. науч. ред.)
606
Chad Bown, “Export Controls”.
607
Rosenberg, Harrell, and Feng, “A New Arsenal for Competition”.
608
“H. R.5841—Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018”, U. S. Congress, June 27, 2018, https://www. congress. gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/5040/text.
609
Stewart Paterson, “US-China Decoupling: How Far Could It Go?”, Hinrich Foundation, September 2, 2020, https://www. hinrichfoundation. com/research/wp/us-china/us-china-decoupling.
610
Uptin Saiidi, “China’s Foreign Direct Investment into the US Dropped Precipitously in 2018, Data Show”, CNBC, January 15, 2019, https://www. cnbc. com/2019/01/15/chinese-foreign-direct-investment-to-the-us-falls-in‐2018-data. html.
611
Rosenberg, Harrell, and Feng, “A New Arsenal for Competition”.
612
Entity List — перечень физических лиц, организаций и правительств, составляемый Бюро промышленности и безопасности — агентством Министерства торговли США. Для субъектов списка требуются американские лицензии на экспорт определенных товаров (в частности, технологий), но компании Соединенных Штатов вполне могут покупать товары у субъектов списка. (Прим. пер.)
613
“Addition of Entities to the Entity List”, Federal Register, May 21, 2019, https://www. federalregister. gov/documents/2019/05/21/2019–10616/addition-of-entities-to-the-entity-list.
